Why we shouldn't fault Lucas and Penrose for continuing to believe in
  the Goedelian argument against computationalism by Anand, Bhupinder Singh
Why we shouldn’t fault Lucas and 
Penrose for continuing to believe in the 
Gödelian argument against 
computationalism 
& 
how we should, instead, use Gödel’s reasoning to define logical 
satisfaction, logical truth, logical soundness, and logical completeness 
verifiably, and unarguably 
Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
The only fault we can fairly lay at Lucas’ and Penrose’s doors, for continuing to 
believe in the essential soundness of the Gödelian argument, is their naïve faith 
in, first, non-verifiable assertions in standard expositions of classical theory, and, 
second, in Gödel’s unvalidated interpretation of his own formal reasoning. We 
show why their faith is misplaced in both instances. 
1. Introduction 
Although most reasoned critiques (such as, for instance, [Bo90], [Br00], [Da93], [Fe96], 
[La98], [Le69], [Le89], [Pu95]) of Lucas’ and Penrose’s arguments against 
computationalism are unassailable, they do not satisfactorily explain why Lucas and 
Penrose - reasonable men, both - remain convinced of the essential soundness of their 
own arguments ([Lu96], [Pe96]). 
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A less technically critical review of their arguments is, indeed, necessary to appreciate 
the reasonability of their belief. It stems from the fact that, on the one hand, Lucas and 
Penrose have, unquestioningly, put faith in, and followed, standard expositions of 
classical theory in overlooking what Gödel has actually proven in Theorem VI ([Go31], 
p24) of his seminal 1931 paper [Go31] on formally undecidable arithmetical 
propositions; on the other, they have, similarly, put faith in, and uncritically accepted as 
definitive, Gödel's own, informal and unvalidated, interpretation of the implications of 
this Theorem ([Go31], p27). 
They should not be taken to task on either count for their faith; it is standard expositions 
of Gödel’s reasoning that remain ambiguously silent on both issues. 
In this paper, we show that such ambiguity and silence has been, and continues to be, 
both, misleading and unnecessary. We show, specifically, that in [Go31], Gödel has - 
albeit implicitly2, and perhaps unwittingly and unknowingly - defined the logical 
satisfaction and logical truth of the formulas of an Arithmetic, the logical soundness of 
the Arithmetic itself, and the logical completeness of the Arithmetic, in an effective and 
verifiable manner within the Arithmetic. 
Why the definitions have not been explicitly recognised by, both, Gödel (at least in 
[Go65]), and standard expositions of his reasoning (such as, for instance, [Be59], [Bo03], 
[Ch98], [Da93], [Fe96], [Me64], [R087], [Ro36], [Ro39], [Sh67], [Sm92], [Wa64]) is a 
mystery. 
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The question we need to ask is, however: How differently would we have viewed 
Gödel’s reasoning, and its consequences, had Gödel defined logical satisfiability, logical 
truth, logical soundness and logical completeness explicitly as below. 
2. Can verifiable logical truth be formalised in Peano Arithmetic? 
Now, standard expositions of Tarski’s Theorem [Ta36] - to the effect that the set of 
Gödel numbers of the formulas of any first-order Peano Arithmetic, which are intuitively 
true in the standard model3 of the Arithmetic, is not arithmetical - appear to implicitly 
suggest that a verifiable ‘logical truth’ of the formulas of standard Peano Arithmetic, 
under an interpretation, cannot be formalised in the Arithmetic. 
Accepting this, seeming, implication unquestioningly, Lucas and Penrose use it explicitly 
as an arguable cornerstone of the Gödelian argument4 [Lu61][Pe90][Pe94]. 
However, the crucial point provable by Gödel’s reasoning in [Go31], but one whose 
significance has been overlooked, both, by him as well as by standard expositions of his 
reasoning, is that such a conclusion is not just arguable - it is false. 
                                                 
3
 We define the “standard interpretation” of first-order Peano Arithmetic, PA, as (cf. [Me64], p107): 
 
“... the interpretation in which 
 
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain, 
(b) the integer 0 is the interpretation of the symbol 0, 
(c) the successor operation (addition of 1) is the interpretation of the ' function (i.e., of f11), 
(d) ordinary addition and multiplication are the interpretations of + and ., 
(e) the interpretation of the predicate letter = is the identity relation.” 
 
In other words, the interpreted, arithmetical, relation R(x) is obtained from the formula [R(x)] of PA by 
replacing every primitive, undefined, symbol of PA in the formula [R(x)] by an intuitively interpreted 
mathematical symbol (i.e. a symbol that is a shorthand notation for some, semantically well-defined, 
concept of classical mathematics) as in (a)-(e). 
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3. Tarski’s definitions of satisfiability and truth 
Now, the standard definitions of the satisfiability, and truth, of the formulas of a formal 
language, say L, under a well-defined interpretation5, say M, are due to Tarski [Ta36]. 
Thus, a formula6 [R(x)] of L is defined as satisfied under M if, and only if, it's 
corresponding interpretation, say R*(x), holds7 in M for any assignment of a value s that 
lies within the range of the variable x in M. 
The formula [(Ax)R(x)] of L is, then, defined as true under the interpretation M if, and 
only if, [R(x)] is satisfied under M. 
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obtained from the formula [R(x)] of the formal system P by replacing every primitive, undefined symbol of 
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Moreover, the formula [~(Ax)R(x)] of L is, further, defined as true under the 
interpretation M if, and only if, [(Ax)R(x)] is not true under M. 
Clearly, mathematical satisfaction and truth is, thus, defined relative only to an 
interpretation. 
The Gödelian argument, quite reasonably, therefore, attempts to draw philosophical 
conclusions from the meta-logical status of the intuitive satisfaction and intuitive truth 
given in mathematical reasoning to the formulas of Peano Arithmetic under its standard, 
intuitive, interpretation. 
4. Definition of verifiable logical satisfaction and logical truth 
However, if we take M to be an interpretation of L in L itself, then we have the, 
classically overlooked, formalisation of the concepts of verifiable, and unarguable, 
logical satisfaction, and logical truth, of the formulas [R(x)] and [(Ax)R(x)] of L, 
respectively, in L, as: 
The formula [R(x)] of L is defined as logically satisfied under L if, and only if [R(s)] 
is provable8 in L for any term [s] that can be substituted for the variable [x] in [R(x)]. 
The formula [(Ax)R(x)] of L is logically true in L if, and only if, [R(s)] is logically 
satisfied in L. 
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 Gödel has shown in [Go31] that the concept of ‘provability’ can be defined constructively, and in a 
verifiable manner, in recursively defined languages by means of primitive recursive functions and relations. 
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5. Definition of verifiable logical soundness 
If we, further, define logical soundness as the property that the axioms of a theory are 
satisfied in the theory itself, and that the rules of inference preserve logical truth, then, it 
follows that the theorems of any logically sound theory are logically true in the theory. 
It is straightforward to verify that first-order Peano Arithmetic is, indeed, logically sound. 
6. Gödelian propositions 
Now, even if the formula [(Ax)R(x)] is not provable in L, it would be logically true in L 
if, and only if, the formula [R(s)] is always provable in L for every well-defined term [s] 
of L that can be substituted for [x] in [R(x)]. 
An instance of such a Gödelian proposition is, precisely, what Gödel has proven in his 
Theorem VI ([Go31], p24) for Peano Arithmetic9 - by constructing a formula, [(Ax)R(x)], 
of PA that is, itself, unprovable in PA, even though, for any given numeral [n], [R(n)] is 
provable in PA. 
So, Gödel has actually constructed a formally unprovable Arithmetical formula that is not 
only intuitively true in the standard, intuitive, interpretation of the Arithmetic, but which 
is also logically true in the Arithmetic in a verifiable, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable, manner that leaves no room for dispute as to its ‘truth’ status. 
Moreover, since the Arithmetic can be shown to be logically sound - again in a verifiable, 
and intuitionistically unobjectionable, manner - standard expositions of Gödel’s meta-
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reasoning no longer need appeal to the (arguable) assumption that the Arithmetic is 
intuitively sound under the standard interpretation10. 
Prima facie, removing the debatable elements of intuitive soundness and intuitive truth 
from the Gödelian argument - which is built around the above construction - and 
replacing them with verifiable definitions of logical soundness, logical satisfaction, and 
logical truth, should help place the argument against computationalism in better 
perspective. 
7. Standard expositions should appeal to verifiable logical satisfaction 
and logical truth, not to intuitive truth  
However, standard expositions of Gödel’s reasoning - including Gödel’s own - continue 
to overlook such verifiable, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, formalisations of the 
concepts of the logical satisfaction, and the logical truth, of the formulas of Peano 
Arithmetic in the Arithmetic itself. 
Instead, they admit into the foundations of first-order Peano Arithmetic concepts of 
unverifiable (hence arguable), intuitive satisfaction and intuitive truth that are only 
Platonically conceivable in individual, intuitive, ‘standard’ interpretations of the 
Arithmetic.  
Surely Lucas and Penrose should not be faulted for treating this as a necessary, and 
definitive, omission, and for continuing to believe in the essential soundness of the 
Platonic, individual, intuitive interpretations and consequences of their own reasoning! 
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8. There are no non-trivial non-standard models of first order Peano 
Arithmetic 
The significance of defining logical satisfaction, logical truth, logical soundness, and 
logical completeness, verifiably, may be far-reaching (Appendix B). 
For instance, standard expositions of Gödel’s reasoning seem to derive legitimacy for the 
existence of non-trivial11, non-standard, models of Peano Arithmetic only from Gödel’s 
unvalidated assertion12 - at the end of his proof of Theorem VI ([Go31], p27) - which 
implicitly implies that, if [(Ax)R(x)] is a Gödelian proposition of PA, then the axiomatic 
addition of [~(Ax)R(x)] to PA will, first, not invite inconsistency, and, second, will yield 
a formal system, PA+[~(Ax)R(x)], with a non-trivial, non-standard, model, say M', of 
first-order Peano Arithmetic in which ~R(s) holds for some s in the domain of M' that is 
not a natural number. 
However, this, again, is demonstrably false, if we require, reasonably, that consistency 
demand the extended theory remain logically sound in a verifiable manner. 
For, by the above application of Tarski’'s definitions to PA itself, it would falsely imply 
that: 
Since [~(Ax)R(x)] is provable in PA+[~(Ax)R(x)], it is logically true in 
PA+[~(Ax)R(x)]; hence [(Ax)R(x)] is logically false in PA+[~(Ax)R(x)], and so 
[R(n)] is not provable for every numeral [n] in PA+[~(Ax)R(x)]. 
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Clearly, PA+[~(Ax)R(x)] is not logically sound. We cannot, therefore, assume - as Gödel 
does - that it must be consistent if PA is consistent. 
9. Intuitive truth admits arguable Platonic conclusions 
So, perhaps, one should not be too harsh on the, mathematically questionable, 
philosophical conclusions that Penrose and Lucas draw from the assertion - implicitly 
endorsable by standard expositions of Gödel's reasoning - that [Lu96]: 
… in the case of First-order Peano Arithmetic there are Gödelian formulae (many, in 
fact infinitely many, one for each system of coding) which are not assigned truth-
values by the rules of the system, and which could therefore be assigned either TRUE 
or FALSE, each such assignment yielding a logically possible, consistent system. 
These systems are random vaunts, all satisfying the core description of Peano 
Arithmetic. 
10. Conclusions 
What we have highlighted, above, is that the Gödelian argument draws sustenance from 
the fact that standard expositions of Gödel’s reasoning appeal to the intuitive satisfaction 
and intuitive truth of the formulas of Peano Arithmetic, and the intuitive soundness of the 
Arithmetic, under an intuitive (hence arguable) standard interpretation; the concepts are 
not defined explicitly in an effectively verifiable manner. 
We have shown that this ambiguous appeal, however, is easily avoided by using Gödel’s 
reasoning to define the concepts of logical satisfaction, logical truth, and logical 
soundness in an effectively verifiable manner. 
Moreover, if we define an Arithmetic as logically complete if, and only if, every logically 
true formula is provable in the Arithmetic, and require, further, that the provable 
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formulas of a language must be logically sound, then we have the, more illuminating, 
interpretation of Gödel’s reasoning as the assertion that Peano Arithmetic is not only 
intuitively incomplete - as asserted by, both, Gödel and standard expositions of his 
reasoning - but it is also logically incomplete. 
Further, unlike the standard expositions of Gödelian incompleteness, which are rooted in 
the concept of an intuitive, hence arguable, truth in the standard model of Peano 
Arithmetic, logical incompleteness is not susceptible to the Gödelian argument. 
Appendix A: Commentary on mathematical objects and mathematical 
truth 
The underlying issue, here, seems to be whether we can arrive at a common consensus 
with Lucas and Penrose on how we are to treat the terms ‘mathematics’ and 
‘computation’. 
If we can begin by agreeing that, by ‘mathematics’, we mean those of our abstract mental 
concepts that can be expressed precisely and unambiguously in recursively definable 
mathematical languages, then the remaining issue is simply that of finding a mutually 
acceptable definition of ‘computation’ . 
Now, there seems to be a curious, common, reluctance to highlight the fact that there are 
well-defined mathematical functions and relations that, classically, have been accepted as 
effectively computable / decidable, yet which are treated as ‘uncomputable / undecidable’ 
in current expositions of classical theory! 
For instance, Dedekind’s definition of a real number in terms of cuts, and the equivalent 
definition in terms of Cauchy sequences are, both, effectively computable / decidable. 
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This is why Chaitin [Ch98] can claim that his Omegas define real numbers (assuming 
that the definitions are valid), since any digit of a given definition of an Omega can be 
effectively computed mechanically. However, there is no single algorithm that can 
effectively decide the value of any digit of a given Omega. 
A.1 Well-defined functions can be effectively computable instantiationally, but not 
algorithmically 
The straightforward way of expressing this phenomenon should be to say that there are 
well-defined real numbers that are instantiationally computable, but not algorithmically 
computable. 
So why is this terminology uncomfortable for current expositions of classical theory, and 
why should the Omegas, amongst other, similarly definable, functions be termed as 
‘uncomputable’ even in Computability Theory13? 
A.2 We use the term ‘exists’ ambiguously 
The deeper issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract 
objects (elements) of our individual, and common, mental ‘concept spaces’, we use the 
word ‘exists’ loosely in three senses, without making explicit distinctions between them. 
First, we may mean that an individually conceivable object exists within a language L if 
it lies within the range of the variables of L. The existence of such objects is necessarily 
derived from the grammar and rules of construction of the appropriate constant terms of 
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 “After all, although no Turing machine computes the function d, we were able to compute at least its first 
few values, For since, as we have noted, f1 = f1 = f1 = the empty function we have d(1) = d(2) = d(3) = 1. 
And it may seem that we can actually compute d(n) for any positive integer n - if we don’t run out of 
time.” ([Bo02], Ch. 4, Uncomputability, p37) 
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the language - generally finitary in recursively defined languages - and can be termed as 
constructive in L by definition. 
Second, we may mean that an individually conceivable object exists under a formal 
interpretation of L in another formal language, say L', if it lies within the range of a 
variable of L under the interpretation. 
Again, the existence of such an object in L' is necessarily derivable from the grammar 
and rules of construction of the appropriate constant terms of L', and can be termed as 
constructive in L' by definition. 
Third, we may mean that an individually conceivable, object exists, in an interpretation 
M of L, if it lies within the range of an interpreted variable of L, where M is a Platonic 
interpretation of L in an individual’s subjective mental conception (a la Brouwer). 
Clearly, the debatable issue is the third case. 
A.3 Can we correlate diverse, individually conceivable, interpretations 
unambiguously? 
So the question is whether we can - and, if so, how we may - correspond the, Platonically 
conceivable, objects of various individual interpretations of L, say M, M', M'', ..., 
unambiguously to the mathematical objects that are definable as the constant terms of L. 
If we can achieve this, we can, then, attempt to relate L to a common external world, and 
try to communicate effectively about our individual mental concepts of the world that we 
accept as lying, by consensus, in a common, Platonic, ‘concept space’. 
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A.4 The central role of the standard interpretation of first-order Peano Arithmetic 
For mathematical languages, such an intuitionistically unobjectionable, common, 
‘concept space’, is, implicitly, accepted as the set of individual, intuitive, Platonically 
conceivable, perceptions - M', M", M'", ... - of the definition of the standard, intuitive, 
interpretation, say M, of Dedekind’s formulation of the Peano Axioms. 
Reasonably, if we intend a language, or a set of languages, to be adequate, first, for the 
expression of the abstract concepts of an individual consciousness, and, second, for the 
unambiguous and effective communication of those of such concepts that we can accept 
as lying within our common concept space, then we need to give effective guidelines for 
determining the, Platonically conceivable, mathematical objects of an individual 
perception of M that we can agree upon, by common consensus, as corresponding to the 
constants (mathematical objects) definable within the language. 
A.5 The role of Church’s and Turing’s Theses in legitimising the standard 
interpretation 
Now, in the case of mathematical languages in standard expositions of classical theory, 
this role is sought to be filled by the Church and Turing Theses. Their standard 
formulations postulate that every effectively computable number-theoretic function (or 
relation, treated as a Boolean function) of M is partial recursive / Turing-computable. 
However, curiously, even Computability Theory is reluctant to note that these Theses do 
not succeed in their objective completely. 
Thus, even if we accept the standard formulations of the Theses, we still cannot conclude 
that we have specified explicitly that the domain of M consists of only constructive 
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mathematical objects that can be represented in the most basic of our formal 
mathematical languages, namely, first-order Peano Arithmetic and Recursive Arithmetic. 
A.6 The standard formulation of CT violates the principle of Occam’s razor 
The reason seems to be that the Church and Turing Theses - CT for short - are postulated 
as strong identities14, which, prima facie, go beyond the minimum requirements for the 
correspondence between the, Platonically conceivable, mathematical objects of M and 
those of PA and Recursive Arithmetic. 
This violation of the principle of Occam’s Razor is highlighted if we note that every 
recursive function (or relation) is not identical to a unique arithmetical function (or 
relation), but only instantiationally equivalent to an infinity of arithmetical functions (or 
relations)15. 
Thus, the standard form of CT only postulates as constructive the algorithmically 
computable number-theoretic functions of M. 
It leaves open the question of the significance that we are to permit to the individual, 
Platonically conceivable, non-constructive, elements of M. 
It also obscures the issue of whether there are constructive, instantiationally computable 
but algorithmically uncomputable, number-theoretic functions and relations. 
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 For instance, in [Ch36], Church writes: “We now define the notion, already discussed, of an effectively 
calculable function of positive integers by identifying it with the notion of a recursive function of positive 
integers.” 
 
Correspondingly, Turing notes, in [Tu36], that: “The theorem that all effectively calculable sequences are 
computable and its converse are proved below in outline”. 
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 See Theorem VII in [Go31]. 
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A.7 Standard expositions of classical theory are restrictive because they identify 
effective computability with algorithmic computability 
Thus, standard expositions of classical theory imply - albeit implicitly - that only 
algorithmically computable functions (and relations) can be termed as constructive. 
It is the tacit acceptance of this implicit implication that prevents, for instance, a 
constructive definition of what we are individually able to conceive as a random real 
number - one whose digits are instantiationally computable effectively, but which are not 
computable algorithmically (such as, for instance, Chaitin's Omegas, assuming that they 
are, indeed, well-defined real numbers). 
A.8 We can define arithmetical truth effectively  
Now, such implicit implication can be avoided by explicitly recognising that there are 
well-defined mathematically expressible functions (and relations) which can, intuitively, 
be termed as effectively computable / decidable instantiationally (i.e., in any given 
instance, by some mechanical method that depends on the given instance), even though 
they are not computable / decidable algorithmically (i.e., by a common mechanical 
method that applies to every given instance). 
Recognition of this immediately allows us to define logical truth effectively (at least for 
Peano Arithmetic, as outlined earlier), under Tarski’s definitions of the satisfiability and 
truth of the formal expressions of a language under a well-defined interpretation - despite 
the perceived limitations of Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’ Theorems, Tarski’s Theorem that 
the set of Gödel numbers of true arithmetical statements is not arithmetical, Turing’s 
Halting Theorem, and Cantor’s diagonal argument. 
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A.9 Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’ Theorems, Tarski’s Theorem, Turing’s Halting 
Theorem, and Cantor’s diagonal argument in perspective.  
For instance, the reason there is a formally unprovable expression of Peano Arithmetic 
that, under the standard interpretation of the language, translates, both, as intuitively, and 
as logically, true - under Tarski’s definitions of the satisfiability and truth of such 
expressions under an interpretation - simply means that even standard formulations of 
Tarski’s definitions admit the possibility of arithmetical relations as true that are 
instantiationally, but not algorithmically, true for any given set of natural number values 
in the interpretation, whereas a provable expression of PA necessarily translates as a 
relation that is algorithmically decidable as true in the interpretation. 
So, Gödel’s unprovable, but intuitively true, arithmetical relation may simply be one that 
is effectively decidable as logically true in every instance (which Gödel has proved), but 
which may not be algorithmically decidable as logically true (a point that does not seem 
to have been considered explicitly in current expositions of classical theory). 
This, in essence, would be a reasonable interpretation of Tarski’s Theorem - that there are 
arithmetical relations that are effectively decidable instantiationally, but not 
algorithmically. 
Further, since we can define an arithmetical relation as effectively decidable 
instantiationally if, and only if, each instance of it were provable in Peano Arithmetic, it 
would be more illuminating to say that Peano Arithmetic can be termed as 
instantiationally complete, but not algorithmically complete. 
Similarly, Turing’s Halting Theorem (as also Cantor’s diagonal construction) can be 
interpreted as asserting that there are well-defined number-theoretic functions (real 
numbers) that are effectively computable instantiationally, but not algorithmically. 
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A.10 Consequences of strengthening the weakened forms of CT with a plausible 
arithmetical Provability Thesis  
Moreover, under an intuitionistically unobjectionable - and plausible - Provability Thesis 
(to the effect that a total arithmetical relation is PA-provable if, and only if, it is 
algorithmically decidable), we can define an architecture for a trio of Turing machines 
such that it can define a total number-theoretic function that is effectively computable 
instantiationally, but not algorithmically16. 
Obviously, acceptance of such a Thesis as intuitionistically unobjectionable implies that 
the standard forms of the Church and Turing Theses need to be weakened to 
equivalences. 
It also implies that there are no non-trivial, non-standard, models of Peano Arithmetic, an 
immediate corollary of which is that P ≠ NP (Appendix B). 
However, a more interesting benefit of weakening the Church and Turing Theses is that 
they, then, provide the equivalent instantiational, arithmetical, completeness - in first-
order theory - that is provided in second-order Peano Arithmetic (which formalises our 
concepts of the natural numbers as expressed by Dedekind’s Peano Postulates) by the 
second-order Induction Axiom. 
Such completeness would be of significance to the computational thesis - which Lucas 
and Penrose attempt to refute by the Gödelian argument - that all ‘mathematics’ is 
precisely captured by ‘computation’. 
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 The author develops this argument further in various arXived, but unpublished, papers. 
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Appendix B: If first-order Peano Arithmetic has no consistent non-
trivial, non-standard, models, then P ≠ NP 
P ≠ NP is the central open problem in complexity theory [Co00], one of whose 
formulations is the following [Ra02]: 
“Is there a polynomial time algorithm A that gets as input a Boolean formula f and 
outputs 1 if and only if f is a tautology? P ≠ NP states that there is no such algorithm.” 
Now, Gödel has defined a formula, [R(x)], such that: 
(i) [R(x)] is constructible in standard, first-order, Peano Arithmetic, PA; 
(ii) we can prove, meta-mathematically, that [R(x)] translates as an arithmetical 
tautology, R(x), under the standard interpretation of the Arithmetic; 
(iii) [R(x)] is not provable in the Arithmetic. 
The question arises: Is R(x) Turing-decidable as TRUE? 
If we assume, first, the thesis that every total arithmetical relation that is Turing-
decidable as TRUE is PA-provable, then R(x) is not Turing-decidable as TRUE, and, so, 
P ≠ NP. 
If we assume, however, that there is a total arithmetical relation that is Turing-decidable 
as TRUE, but which is not PA-provable, then this implies that there is a consistent, non-
trivial, non-standard, model of PA, in which [R(s)] is satisfied for some term [s] of the 
interpretation that is not a natural number. 
We conclude that, if PA has no consistent, non-trivial, non-standard models, then, under 
the above expression of the PvNP problem, P ≠ NP. 
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